1. The complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and the ultimate realization of a world without nuclear weapons, serve the common interests of mankind. China undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and unconditionally commits itself not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free-zones. Pending the ultimate realization of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon States should unequivocally undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstance, and unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

2. The majority of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT have long held that, pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it is the legitimate right of non-nuclear-weapon States to receive legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

The Final Document of SSOD-I in 1978 urges nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The Final Document of 2000 NPT review conference pointed out that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The Final Document of 2010 NPT review conference pointed out that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangement to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument.

3. Nuclear-weapon States have provided security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States through such means as UNSC resolutions, national statements and the signing and ratification of protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, but in most cases conditions have been attached. Nuclear-weapon-free zones do not cover all regions and all non-nuclear-weapon States. For example, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East faces realistic obstacles.

4. Nuclear-weapon States providing legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States is conducive to maintaining global strategic stability, reducing strategic risks, strengthening the international non-proliferation regime, advancing nuclear disarmament, and ultimately realizing the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Under the new security situation, the issue of providing negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States has become more important and urgent and should be regarded as a priority of the current review cycle.

5. In the NPT review process, many countries believe the existence of nuclear sharing and extended deterrence diminishes the political willingness of countries participating in the above arrangements to build nuclear-weapon-free zones or conclude an international legal instrument on security assurances. Many countries are highly concerned about the role of non-nuclear-weapon States that are part of the above arrangement in the deployment, use and decision-making of nuclear weapons.

6. Given the above reasons, China strongly calls for conclusion of an international legal instrument as soon as possible on not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free-zones. Therefore, China proposes an in-depth discussions on the following issues in the 11th Review Conference of NPT and its Preparatory Committee Meetings, and seek consensus on the above issues to be included in the outcome documents.

(a) The Conference on Disarmament (CD) should start substantive work as soon as possible on concluding an international legal instrument on not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free-zones.

(b) Before concluding the international legal instrument, all of the nuclear-weapon States should make public statements to unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

(c) Nuclear-weapon States should support the efforts of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect the legal status of nuclear-weapon-free zones, sign and ratify the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, and take concrete measures to implement relevant the safety assurances. Nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States should all refrain from taking actions that would undermine or damage the position of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

(d) Nuclear-weapon States should diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies, abandon the nuclear deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons, refrain from making tailored nuclear deterrence policy against other countries, refrain from listing any country as the target of nuclear strike, reduce the alert status, and refrain from targeting nuclear weapons at any other country.

(e) The relevant nuclear-weapon State should abandon the arrangement of nuclear sharing and extended deterrence, and withdraw all nuclear weapons deployed abroad back to its own territories. Before achieving this goal, the relevant nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States should be transparent about the arrangements above, and clarify whether they have breached Article 1 and 2 of the NPT. Meanwhile, in the context of concluding the international legal instrument on security assurances, the international community should have in-depth discussions on the rights and obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States participating in the arrangements of nuclear sharing and extended deterrence.