Today, the global security environment has experienced profound and complex changes. The international arms control regime is faced with serious challenges. Since 2010, two consecutive NPT review cycles ended without a consensus outcome. Thus the success of the current review cycle is of great importance. China believes that all sides should focus on urgent issues of the nuclear arms control area, promote nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a comprehensive and balanced manner on the basis of mutual respect, ensure that this review cycle could produce substantive results and to jointly uphold the authority and effectiveness of the NPT.
China suggests that the 2026 NPT Review Conference and its Preparatory Sessions discuss the following issues in-depth and strive for these consensus to be included in the Final Document.
1. Nuclear disarmament should follow the principle of “maintaining global strategic stability” and “undiminished security for all” and take a step-by-step approach. The two countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should take special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and continue to make drastic and substantive reductions in their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible and legally binding manner, so as to create necessary conditions for general and complete nuclear disarmament.
2. The New Start Treaty signed by the U.S. and Russia is of key importance to maintain global strategic stability and promote world peace and safety. The two sides should settle their disputes through dialogue, promote the continuous implementation of the Treaty, and try to extend the New Start Treaty before its expiration in 2026 or negotiate on a successor arrangement.
3. Nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to the effective implementation of Article 6 of the NPT, abide by consensuses on nuclear disarmament reached in previous NPT Review Conferences, and openly declare that they have no intention to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons.
4. Nuclear-weapon States should abandon the nuclear deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons and adopt the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, support concluding a treaty or issuing a joint political statement on the mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons.
5. Nuclear-weapon States should support the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating a legal instrument providing negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States as soon as possible, support the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee in this regard and start substantive work.
6. Nuclear-weapon States should reaffirm that none of their nuclear weapons are targeted at each other or at any other State, lower the alert status of nuclear weapons, refrain from formulating nuclear deterrence policies tailored against certain countries, avoid accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear weapons, and eliminate the risks of accidents on nuclear weapons.
7. Nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States participating in the so-called nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements should take concrete measures to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national and collective security doctrines, clarify that whether these arrangements are complying with the Article I and II of NPT. Relevant nuclear-weapon States should withdrawing their nuclear weapons deployed overseas, ceasing and not replicating nuclear-sharing arrangements, not conducting nuclear exercises or exchanging nuclear information with non-nuclear-weapon States.
8. All countries should abandon development or deployment of the global missile defense system, withdrawing missiles and missile defense systems deployed overseas, committing not to deploy additional weapon systems abroad that undermine strategic stability.
9. All countries should stick to the idea of peaceful use of outer space, committing not to use or threaten to use force against outer space objects, and supporting the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating a legally-binding instrument of outer space arms control.
10. International community should continue to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among the non-nuclear-weapon States of the region concerned. Nuclear-weapon States should respect the legal status of nuclear-weapon-free zones, sign and ratify all relevant protocols to nuclear- weapon-free zone treaties as soon as possible, including the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.
11. The international community should continue to support the establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. Nuclear-weapon States and relevant regional countries should participate in the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.
12. All parties should comply with the NPT obligations in a comprehensive, faithful and balanced manner,support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in fulfilling its safeguard function in a fair, objective and impartial manner, and promote the universality of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. States that have not yet joined the NPT should do so as non-nuclear-weapon States as soon as possible, and place all nuclear facilities under the safeguards of IAEA in accordance with the NPT provisions.
13. The international community should support all IAEA member States in jointly discussing AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine safeguards issue through a transparent, open and inclusive intergovernmental process, and making decisions by consensus. Before all parties reach consensus, the three countries shall not start nuclear-powered submarine cooperation. The Secretariat or the IAEA shall not negotiate and conclude safeguards arrangements with the three countries arbitrarily.
14. All parties should uphold the authority of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and UNSC Resolution 2231, support the diplomatic efforts to revive JCPOA, support efforts of the IAEA and Iran to solve outstanding safeguards issues through dialogue and cooperation, and actively promote the political and diplomatic settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. As the party which unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA, the US should correct its wrong policies, and positively respond to Iran’s reasonable and legitimate concerns.
15. The international community should stay committed to resolve the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue through dialogue and consultation. Parties should continue to follow the dual track approach of pursuing establishment of a peace mechanism and denuclearization of the Peninsula and the principle of a phased and synchronized approach, and explore effective ways to address concerns of all parties in a balanced manner. Relevant parties should exercise restraint, and refrain from taking any action that may lead to the escalation of tensions, so as to create favorable condition for a political solution.
16. Efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should not undermine the legitimate rights of peaceful uses of nuclear energy of States parties, especially developing countries. The international community should refrain from politicizing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy issues, so as not to disrupt or hinder regular international cooperation. We oppose relevant countries drawing lines on ideological grounds,abusing the concept of national security and utilizing export control as a tool to pursue its agenda of decoupling and chains breaking in the name of non-proliferation.
17. IAEA should continue to play a central role in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Developed countries and IAEA should provide more assistance to developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy based on their actual needs. Member States should actively support the IAEA’s technical cooperation activities to ensure its adequate and predictable resources,thus meeting the growing needs for technical cooperation.
18. Guarantee the safety of peaceful nuclear facilities and oppose armed attacks against nuclear power plants or other peaceful nuclear facilities. All parties should comply with the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), resolutely avoid man-made nuclear accident, and support IAEA to play a positive role in promoting the safety and security of peaceful nuclear facilities.
19. State parties should strictly fulfill the national responsibilities of nuclear safety. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not sacrifice the natural environment and human health. The Japanese government should properly handle the issue of Fukushima nuclear-contaminated water discharge with responsible and constructive attitude, and cooperate to create an independent, effective and long-term international monitoring arrangement with substantive participation of neighboring countries and other stakeholders, so as to avoid irrevocable consequences from the discharge.