(Geneva, 26 July 2024)

Mr. Chair,

Strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and eliminating nuclear proliferation risks are the inherent requirement of preserving the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). At present, certain nuclear-weapon States are obsessed with Cold War mentality and great power competition, adopt double standards and pragmatism on non-proliferation issues, and place geopolitical interests above the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. All these seriously violate the original purpose of non-proliferation, undermine the consensus and authority of non-proliferation, and increase the risk of nuclear proliferation.

In light of the current situation, it is imperative for the international community to uphold the concept of common security, take the new round of NPT review process as an opportunity, and uphold the authority and effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. To this end, China stresses the following three points.

First, stop actions that weaken the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Nuclear sharing violates the purpose and principles of the NPT and there has been signs of its spread to the Asia-Pacific region. The United States has strengthened extended deterrence in Asia-pacific region. This has increased tensions in the Asia-Pacific region and stimulated nuclear arms race and proliferation risks. Nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States participating in nuclear sharing and extended deterrence should take concrete measures to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national and collective security policies, and withdraw nuclear weapons deployed abroad as soon as possible. They should not replicate the nuclear sharing arrangements in any way in other regions. The United States deployed intermediate-range missiles in the Philippines, reversing the course of history, threatening the security of countries in the region, and increasing the risks of miscalculation. China urges the United States to reduce strategic risks by concrete actions. The AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine cooperation has put the international nuclear non-proliferation regime under stress and run counter to the object and purpose of the NPT. If such cooperation is not properly handled, it will inevitably open the Pandora’s box of nuclear proliferation, and bring profound negative impact. All member states of the IAEA should work together to promote an open, inclusive, transparent and sustainable intergovernmental discussion process, make decisions through consensus, and firmly uphold the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Second, regional hotspot issues should be resolved through political and diplomatic means. Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula serves the common interests of all parties and the expectation of the international community. The long-standing stalemate on the Korean Peninsula is rooted in the lingering remnants of the Cold War the lack of a peace mechanism, and the absence of mutual trust among all parties. The dual track approach and the principle of phased and synchronized actions are still practical and feasible solutions to promote the political settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue. The United States needs to break away from the myth of deterrence and pressure, and demonstrate its good faith in “unconditional dialogue” through practical actions. On the Iranian nuclear issue, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a key pillar for maintaining the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and upholding peace and stability in the Middle East. There is currently no realistic and feasible alternative solution at present. As the party that unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA, the US should thoroughly correct its wrong policy, positively respond to Iran's legitimate and reasonable concerns, abandon sanctions and pressure on Iran, return to the right track of decoupling the Iranian nuclear issue negotiation from other issues, and promote the resumption of implementation negotiation of the JCPOA.

Third, we need to uphold and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, States that are not party to the NPT should join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States as soon as possible, and place all of their nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). States should support the IAEA in performing the safeguards duty in an objective, fair and impartial manner, and promote the universality of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. At the same time, any measures to prevent nuclear proliferation must not impede the legitimate rights of all countries to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We should oppose certain countries using the banner of non-proliferation, drawing ideological lines, over-stretching national security concepts, and using export control as a political tool of decoupling. The nuclear-weapon states should sign and ratify the protocols to all the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties including the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. The international community should support efforts to establish a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. China is ready to take the lead in signing the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

Mr.Chair,

China is willing to work with the international community to make unremitting efforts to uphold and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime with the NPT as its cornerstone.

I thank you, Mr. Chair.