Working Paper Submitted by China

Since the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2022, major power competition has been compounded by geopolitical conflicts, uncertainties and destabilizing factors in the international security and development arena are prominent, and differences in global governance system in the nuclear area are complex. This year marks the 80th anniversary of the founding of the United Nation and the 55th anniversary of the NPT’s entry into force. The international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime with the NPT as its cornerstone has come to a critical juncture.

Lasting international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weapons by military alliances, nor can it be sustained by relying on fragile balance of deterrence force or seeking strategic dominance. The international community should practice true multilateralism, firmly uphold the international system with the UN at its core, the international order underpinned by international law, and basic norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, abandon the Cold War mentality and zero-sum game, uphold the inseparability of peace and security, economic and social development, take effective actions to ease tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means, and work together for practical outcomes of the current NPT review cycle, give full play to the role of the NPT in promoting peace and development in the new era, advance international security governance, and accelerate the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

In light of the above, China suggests that NPT States Parties fully draw lessons from past two consecutive NPT review cycles ending without a consensual outcome, build on the work of the first and second PrepCom for the 11th NPT Review conference, take a rational and pragmatic attitude, strengthen dialogue and consultation, seek consensus on the following elements and include them in the final document of the 11th Review Conference in 2026.

1. General Principle

Uphold true multilateralism, advocate the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, reject jointly the Cold War mentality and zero-sum game, promote building a global nuclear governance system that features “NPT for peace and development” .

Advance the three pillars of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a balanced way, maintain the authority, effectiveness and universality of the NPT, consolidate the international non-proliferation regime with the NPT as its cornerstone, eliminate the risk of nuclear war, make unremitting efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. States that have not yet joined the NPT should do so as non-nuclear-weapon States as soon as possible.

Fully and effectively implement the past outcomes and commitments of the NPT review process, including the decisions and resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the commitments contained in the 2000 Review Conference final document and the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference.

Advocate a nuclear disarmament path in which one’s own security and common security are indivisible and maintain global strategic stability, uphold the inseparability of security rights and security obligation and establish a fair and just nuclear non-proliferation regime, uphold the inseparability of security and development and safeguard the right of all States Parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This is what is required for building an equal and orderly multipolar world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization.

2. Nuclear Disarmament

The measures of disarmament should maintain fairness and balance of power, to ensure the security right of all countries, and make sure that no certain country or group of nations gains an advantageous position over others at any stage. In this regard, nuclear disarmament should follow the principles of “maintaining global strategic stability” and “undiminished security for all” and take a step-by-step approach.

The international nuclear arms control system is crucial to maintain global strategic stability and promote world peace and security. Efforts should be made to prevent it from being eroded, undermined or sabotaged. The United States and Russia should settle their disputes regarding the implementation of New START Treaty through dialogue as soon as possible, and reach an extension or alternative arrangement before its expiration in 2026.

Countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should fulfill their special and primary responsibilities for nuclear disarmament and continue to make drastic and substantive reductions in their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible and legally-binding manner, so as to create conditions for other countries to join the nuclear disarmament process towards general and complete nuclear disarmament.

“A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”. Welcome the Joint Statement of Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Nuclear Arms Races issued in January 2022, support the five nuclear-weapon States in implementing the Joint Statement in a proactive manner, strengthen dialogue and cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and equality.

As a logical first step in implementing the above Joint Statement, nuclear-weapon States should abandon the nuclear deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons and adopt the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, negotiate and conclude a treaty on “mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons” or issue a joint political statement in this regard.

Nuclear-weapon States should reaffirm that none of their nuclear weapons are targeted at each other or at any other State, refrain from formulating nuclear deterrence policies tailored against certain countries, avoid accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear weapons, and eliminate the risks of accidents on nuclear weapons.

The offensive and defensive strategic forces are inextricably linked in maintaining strategic stability. Recall the contribution of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) to maintaining global strategic stability, promoting nuclear disarmament and advancing international security, and the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability as referred to in the 13 practical steps of the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document, express grave concern over the unilateral withdrawal from the treaty by relevant country, which has undermined global strategic stability. All countries should abandon development or deployment of the global missile defense system which will undermine the global and regional strategic stability, withdraw missiles and missile defense systems deployed overseas, commit not to deploy additional weapon systems abroad that undermine strategic stability. Prevention of weaponization and arms race in outer space contributes to maintaining global strategic balance and stability. Note with concern that certain country or military political group is seeking to deploy weapons in the outer space and undermine prevention of arms race in outer space, which will damage the principle of “undiminished security for all”, further destroy global strategic stability, and is not conducive to creating a necessary international security environment for nuclear disarmament.

The State Parties to the NPT should actively support the preparatory work for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), support the work of the Preparatory Commission and Provisional Technical Secretariat, foster the early entry into force of that Treaty. Prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, nuclear-weapon States should commit to the moratorium on nuclear testing.

Support the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating a universal, unconditional, and non-discriminatory international legal instrument, so as to effectively ensure that nuclear weapons are not used or threatened to be used against non-nuclear-weapon States under any circumstances as the highest priority. Support the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee in this regard and start substantive work as early as possible.

Reiterate that the Conference on Disarmament is the only appropriate venue for the negotiation of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Support the Conference on Disarmament in initiating relevant negotiations on the basis of reaching a comprehensive and balanced program of work through consensus in accordance with CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.

Nuclear-weapon States should commit to adopting nuclear transparency measures and enhancing mutual trust on a voluntary basis without undermining national security. Meanwhile, transparency and confidence-building measures cannot replace nuclear disarmament. Countries participating in the so-called nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements should take corresponding nuclear transparency responsibilities.

Effective nuclear disarmament verification measures are conducive to enhancing mutual trust among the contracting parties of nuclear disarmament treaties and are important guarantee for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. The promotion of nuclear disarmament verification should balance the issues of credibility and sensitive information protection, prevent nuclear proliferation risks, and specific verification measures should be negotiated and agreed upon by relevant parties. The form and method of verification stipulated in any specific agreement depend on the purpose, scope and nature of the agreement. Support the research on nuclear disarmament verification under the UN framework, with a focus on exploring the feasible measures for nuclear disarmament verification, and provide technical support for the future development of international nuclear disarmament.

Strengthen nuclear disarmament education and enhance public awareness of the importance of achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear-weapons. Build on a comprehensive and objective understanding of history, help the younger generation to accurately understand the humanitarian disasters brought by war and enhance their belief in opposing war and the use of nuclear weapons.

3. Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Persist in peacefully resolving regional nuclear issues through political and diplomatic means. Oppose the wrong practice of double standards, the indiscriminate imposition of illegal unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction, and even the threat of resorting to force. Oppose undermining international treaties and arrangements in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, and oppose placing geopolitics above nuclear non-proliferation.

Implement NPT obligations in a comprehensive, faithful and balanced manner. Support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in fulfilling its safeguard mandate in a fair, objective and impartial manner. Promote the universality of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement, and encourage relevant States to voluntarily join the Additional Protocols. States that have not yet joined the NPT should do so as non-nuclear-weapon States as soon as possible, and place all nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the IAEA.

Adhere to the principles of justice and balance, and properly handle the relationship between nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of the nuclear energy. While bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, no measures to prevent nuclear proliferation shall impede the legitimate rights of all States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international cooperation in nuclear-related materials, equipment and technologies for peaceful purposes. At the same time, no proliferation activities shall be carried out under the pretext of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Attention should be paid to the imbalance between supply and demand of nuclear materials in certain countries, and effective measures should be taken to correct it.

Take practical measures to ensure that nuclear-related exports and cooperation are fully in line with the object and purpose of the NPT and will not directly or indirectly assist in the research and development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Pay attention to the impact of AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine cooperation on international peace and security and the IAEA safeguards system. Support discussing the safeguards issues involved in the above-mentioned cooperation through a transparent, open and inclusive intergovernmental process under the NPT review process and the IAEA framework, and make decision by consensus. Meanwhile, be vigilant that such cooperation undermines regional strategic balance and stability and intensifies regional tensions.

The State Parties to the NPT should pursue nuclear policies that comply with treaty obligations. States participating in the so-called nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements should take concrete measures to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national and collective security doctrines, including not upgrading current arrangements, not conducting nuclear exercises or exchanging nuclear information, not replicating new nuclear-sharing and extended deterrence arrangements. Nuclear-weapon States should withdraw their nuclear weapons deployed overseas as soon as possible.

Stay committed to peaceful settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue through political and diplomatic means, and oppose unilateral actions including the use of force and illegal sanctions that escalate the situation. Stay committed to the momentum of dialogue and negotiations, and support the IAEA and Iran in resolving outstanding safeguards issues through dialogue and cooperation. Stay committed to balancing rights and responsibilities, and take a holistic approach to the goals of nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Stay committed to a step-by-step and reciprocal approach, uphold the principle of mutual respect, take the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as the basis, and reach a solution that accommodates the legitimate concerns of all parties through dialogue and negotiations.

Insist on promoting the political settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue, follow the dual-track approach and principle of a phased and synchronized steps, and explore effective methods to address the concerns of all parties equitably. Relevant countries should take their responsibilities, abandon the practice of imposing sanctions and pressures, and demonstrate sincerity in “unconditional dialogue” through concrete actions.

Reaffirm that establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones is a key step towards achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, and support for relevant countries in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones according to Article 7 of the NPT and the guidelines adopted by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999. Nuclear-weapon countries should respect the legal status of nuclear-weapon-free zones, sign and rectify all additional protocols related to treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones open for signatures as soon as possible.

Reaffirm the importance of comprehensively and effectively implementing relevant decisions and resolutions regarding the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction, and support relevant international processes. Urge relevant countries, especially the NPT States parties, to actively participate in Conference on Establishing a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction, welcome positive progress in the conference process.

Welcome the public statements made by relevant nuclear-weapon State expressing willingness to be the first to sign the Protocol of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. Urge nuclear-weapon States to strengthen communication and dialogues with Southeast Asian countries, and to sign and ratify relevant additional Protocol as soon as possible.

4. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

Reaffirm peaceful uses of nuclear energy is an inalienable right of all countries, which has great significance for promoting social and economic development, responding to global challenges including climate change and energy shortage, and realizing the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. Recall the actions committed in Pact for the Future, support developing countries in peacefully using science, technology and innovation to realize sustainable development.

Effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should not undermine the legitimate rights of all countries, especially Global South countries, to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Firmly oppose the politicization of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the imposition of any inappropriate restrictions inconsistent with the NPT, which may disrupt and restrict normal international cooperation. Oppose any country using the excuse of non-proliferation to draw ideological lines, overstretch the concept of national security, or use export controls as a tool for decoupling and severing supply chains.

Call on States parties to jointly implement the “Promoting International Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security” Resolution (A/RES/79/80) adopted at the 79th session of the UN General Assembly, take concrete measures to fulfill obligations and commitments regarding peaceful uses, continue dialogue on promoting peaceful utilization and related international cooperation, and explore the formulation of guiding principles.

Support the initiative “Atom for Global South” and the continued central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in promoting the uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Developed countries and institutions should, based on the actual needs of Global South nations, further increase assistance in uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including funding, technology and personnel. The IAEA should ensure that technical cooperation resources are sufficient, reliable and predictable, meet the growing needs of States parties for technical cooperation while giving priority to Global South nations. Encourage capable countries to continue providing and increasing voluntary contributions for technical cooperation activities aimed at uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The rapid development of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence has significant implications for promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA and the international community are encouraged to strengthen research cooperation in this field and promote equitable access to nuclear energy for all countries.

Support the IEAE in playing a proactive role in advancing nuclear safety and security. Reiterate that all state parties shall strictly comply with the Convention on Nuclear Safety to avoid man-made nuclear accidents. All efforts should be made to ensure the safety of peaceful nuclear facilities and oppose armed attacks on nuclear power plants or other peaceful nuclear installations. The decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on September 18, 2009,which prohibits armed attacks or threats of armed attacks against operational or under-construction nuclear facilities, shall be fully complied with.

Call on all States Parties to join and abide by conventions and instruments in the fields of nuclear safety and security. State parties developing advanced reactors and small modular reactors including portable reactors are encouraged to enhance cooperation with the IAEA to support the safe and secure deployment of such reactors.

Efforts should be made to eliminate the threat of nuclear terrorism and build a fair, cooperative and win-win system of global nuclear security. All countries should earnestly assume primary responsibility in ensuring nuclear security by continuously enhancing their national capacities and actively participating in international cooperation.

Encourage relevant State Parties, where technically and economically feasible, to voluntarily minimize the civilian use and stockpiling of highly enriched uranium.

Urge States and international organizations with expertise in eliminating and disposing of radioactive contamination to actively consider providing appropriate assistance, upon request, to countries affected by nuclear testing. In particular, nuclear-weapon States that have conducted nuclear tests abroad should fulfill their historical responsibilities and obligations for remediation and compensation, and thoroughly address the humanitarian issues faced by affected countries and their people.