Mr. Chair,  

This morning, China elaborated on its general views and propositions regarding the strengthening of the review process. I would like to take this opportunity to further elaborate on our positions concerning transparency, reporting, and accountability, taking into account the relevant draft document circulated by the Chair.  

China has always maintained that transparency, reporting, and accountability cannot replace nuclear disarmament. The immediate priority is for the countries with the largest nuclear arsenals to earnestly fulfill their special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, to further substantially and significantly reduce their massive nuclear stockpiles, and to promptly negotiate a follow-up agreement to the New START Treaty. Transparency, reporting, and accountability should cover the three pillars of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and apply to all States Parties. Furthermore, given the current realities of international security, full consideration must be given to the differences among nuclear-weapon states in terms of the scale of their nuclear forces, nuclear policies, and security environments, and it must be accepted that countries may have different priorities in nuclear transparency. Requiring all nuclear-weapon States to assume indiscriminate nuclear transparency obligations and adopt a standard reporting template would only reinforce the strategic advantages of some countries while undermining the security interests of others, doing nothing to uphold global peace and stability. The U.S. side just mentioned having disclosed its nuclear weapons numbers twice in the past four years. China doesn't have over 5,000 nuclear weapons to display, so we won't engage in such comparisons with the U.S.

China proposes that the five nuclear-weapon States voluntarily negotiate the frequency of submitting national reports and continue to submit reports under the common framework agreed upon by the five nuclear-weapon States in 2013, without imposing a universally applicable template. If the national reports of nuclear-weapon States are to be reviewed, reports from non-nuclear-weapon States under the “nuclear umbrella”should also be included. The method for reviewing reports requires further discussion, but it is inappropriate to conduct such reviews in the subsidiary body of the First Committee. We are willing to engage in constructive consultations with all parties on this matter.  

Finally, China would like to emphasize that requiring nuclear umbrella states to submit reports for review does not create a third category of states. In the NPT review process, many countries have expressed concern that states under the “nuclear umbrella” exert significant influence over the deployment and use policies of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states. Such “nuclear umbrella” arrangements thus have a direct impact on the international nuclear disarmament process and the non-proliferation regime. This has created de facto inequality among non-nuclear-weapon States. Judging from recent developments, this inequality is actually intensifying. This, in fact, creates security inequalities among non-nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, having these States submit reports and undergo review by reporting on the role of nuclear weapons in their national security and collective security policies, as well as their efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons would contribute to achieving the objectives and purposes of the NPT. Far from affecting their status as non-nuclear-weapon States, this would demonstrate their responsible image as such. Earlier, some States under the “nuclear umbrella” mentioned that all countries should commit to enhancing transparency, reporting, and accountability. We hope they will live up to their words.  

Thank you, Mr. Chair.