As once-in-a-century transformations accelerate,the global strategic security landscape is undergoing profound changes.The resurgence of Cold War mentality, hegemonism and bullying, and the return of the law of the jungle and gunboat diplomacy have exacerbated regional conflicts and arms race, eroded the international arms control and non- proliferation regime, and posed a grave threat to global strategic stability. Certain country,in pursuit of absolute strategic advantage,has provoked bloc confrontation,wantonly resorted to the use of force and withdrawn from international treaties and organizations,thereby becoming the biggest source of destabilization that undermines international order and fuels global turbulence.

China stays committed to the path of peaceful development and upholds humanity's common values.It has actively promoted the building of a community with a shared future for humanity,acted on the Global Development Initiative(GDI),the Global Security Initiative(GSI),the Global Civilization Initiative(GCI)and the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) with a view to upholding world peace and security,and promoting global strategic balance and stability.By working actively to improve global security governance,China is an important and constructive force in the international arms control process.In line with the principles of justice,cooperation,balance and effectiveness in arms control,China has been deeply involved in global governance in the field of arms control, and will continue to make its due contribution to the cause of international arms control.

1.As required by the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),China submitted its national report to the eleventh NPT Review Conference in accordance with the common framework for national reports agreed by the five nuclear-weapon States under the NPT in 2013. The common framework, adopted by the five nuclear-weapon States to draft their national reports, employs common headings that cover the three pillars of the NPT, i.e., nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

2.China attaches great importance to the cornerstone status of the NPT in the fields of international nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. It has made unremitting efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, advance the process of nuclear disarmament and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. China will continue to fulfill the vision for common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security with concrete steps, firmly uphold the authority, validity and universality of the NPT and make its due contribution to international peace and security.

3.In accordance with the relevant requirements of the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences, the Chinese government hereby provides the following account of its implementation of the NPT:

I.Reporting on national measures relating to nuclear disarmament

4.The Chinese government advocates the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and supports the international community in advancing the goal of nuclear disarmament through a step-by-step approach, based on the principles of maintenance of global strategic stability and undiminished security for all. China is committed to a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons and a nuclear strategy of self-defense. It does not engage in a nuclear arms race with any other country, practices maximum nuclear transparency without compromising national security, actively advances nuclear risks reduction measures, and makes its due contribution to the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

(i)National security policies, guidelines and activities related to nuclear weapons

5.China was compelled to make the strategic choice to develop nuclear weapons in a special historical period to deal with nuclear threats and blackmail, break the nuclear monopoly, and prevent nuclear war. This choice was not intended to threaten other countries, but to serve as a means of self-defense against the threat of nuclear war. China believes that the unique nature of nuclear weapons determines that they are a means of strategic deterrence, and using them as an instrument of warfare is unrealistic and extremely dangerous.

6.Since the first day of possession of nuclear weapons, China has advocated for their complete prohibition and thorough destruction. In recent years, Chinese leaders have repeatedly reaffirmed these propositions and principles.

In January 2017, when speaking at the United Nations Office at Geneva, President Xi Jinping stated that nuclear weapons, the Sword of Damocles that hangs over mankind, should be completely prohibited and thoroughly destroyed over time to make the world free of nuclear weapons.

In January 2022, driven by the active efforts of China, the leaders of the five nuclear-weapon States issued the Joint Statement on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, reaffirming that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

In November 2022, President Xi Jinping said in a meeting with the German Chancellor that the international community should jointly oppose the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and advocate that nuclear weapons must not be used and that nuclear wars must not be fought.

In April 2023, President Xi Jinping said in a meeting with the French President that China is ready to work with France to call on the international community to faithfully fulfill its commitment that nuclear weapons must not be used and that nuclear wars must not be fought.

7.China remains committed to the principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It is the only country among the five nuclear-weapon States that has made such a commitment. For decades, whether confronted with nuclear threats or blackmail on multiple occasions during the Cold War, or navigating today’s complex international security environment with serious strategic security threats, China has always honored its commitment. This fully demonstrates China’s utmost prudence and restraint in the use of nuclear weapons. This policy position is the most stable, consistent and predictable among all nuclear-weapon States and represents China’s significant contribution to the cause of international nuclear arms control.

8.China upholds a nuclear strategy of self-defense, with the aim of deterring other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China and maintaining national strategic security. Over the years, China has continuously assessed challenges in the external security environment, and kept its nuclear force at the minimum level required for national security. It does not provide nuclear umbrella to other countries, has never resorted to nuclear weapons to threaten any country, and has never deployed nuclear weapons on foreign soil.

9.China has always exercised the utmost restraint regarding the scale and development of nuclear weapons, and never competed with other countries in terms of spending, quantity or scale. It will never engage in a nuclear arms race with any other country. China has conducted the fewest nuclear tests among the nuclear-weapon States, and has closed down its nuclear weapon research and production facilities in Chongqing, Qinghai and other areas, demonstrating its attitude and actions of not pursuing a nuclear arms race.

10.China undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally. In April 1995, China issued a statement reaffirming its unconditional provision of negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States and its commitment to providing them with positive security assurances. In May 2000, China and the other nuclear-weapon States issued a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to security assurances under U.N. Security Council Resolution 984.

In July 2024, China submitted a working paper to the second session of the Preparatory Committee (PreCom) for the 11th NPT Review Conference, calling for early negotiations on and conclusion of an international legal instrument on unconditional negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. China saw it as an important guarantee for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and an important means of reducing the role of nuclear weapons and promoting nuclear disarmament, and supported the early commencement of substantive work in this regard at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.

11.Maintaining global and regional strategic balance and stability contributes to lowering the risk of a nuclear war. China advocates for joint efforts of all nuclear-weapon States to this end.

First, advocating for common security and setting clear objectives of strategic stability. The maintenance of strategic stability is an important foundation and core principle for advancing the nuclear disarmament process. Nuclear-weapon States should renounce the Cold War mentality and zero-sum games mindset, abandon the policy of first use of nuclear weapons, and the nuclear strategy of pursuing absolute advantage, with a view to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security policies.

Second, continuously boosting mutual trust and cementing the foundation for strategic stability. The nuclear-weapon States should take an objective view of each other’s strategic intentions, respect each other’s security concerns, properly manage differences, stop hyping up major-country confrontation, stop developing and deploying global anti-missile system and other actions that undermine strategic stability, and prevent strategic miscalculations from triggering accidents and crises.

Third, strictly complying with international obligations and commitments and maintaining the framework for strategic stability. The New START Treaty is of great importance to global strategic stability and to a world free of nuclear weapons. It is hoped that the United States will respond positively to the Russian proposal, truly fulfill its special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, so as to create the conditions for the ultimate realization of complete and thorough nuclear disarmament.

ii)Nuclear weapons, nuclear arms control (including nuclear disarmament) and verification

12.In building a lean and effective nuclear force system, China is improving its capabilities in strategic early warning, command and control, missile penetration, rapid response and its survivability, in order to ensure the safety, security, reliability and effectiveness of its nuclear weapons, ensure its strategic deterrence and nuclear counterstrike capability, and deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. The modernization of China’s nuclear force is aimed at continuing to ensure the safety and security, reliability and effectiveness of nuclear weapons in a changing security environment.

13.The command of nuclear force in China is highly centralized and the command process is lean and efficient. It ensures the strictest and most accurate execution of orders of the Central Military Commission. Chinese nuclear forces maintain a moderate level of alert under normal circumstances. When the country is under a nuclear threat, the alert status is raised upon the order of the Central Military Commission to prepare for nuclear counterstrikes, thereby deterring the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China. In the event that the country suffers a nuclear attack, a resolute counterstrike will be mounted against the enemy.

14.China’s nuclear weapons have never had any safety or security problems. China attaches great importance to the safe management and use and effective control of nuclear weapons. From the day of possession of nuclear weapons, China has enforced strict laws, regulations and reliable technical means to ensure safety management throughout the entire process of nuclear weapons storage, transportation and training, so as to effectively prevent any risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch of nuclear missiles, and ensure that the nuclear force remains in a state of absolute security and absolute reliability. China values the development of a nuclear safety culture in the nuclear-related sectors, institutions and forces, and continuously enhances the nuclear safety awareness and sense of responsibility of all personnel involved in nuclear affairs.

15.China actively participates in international nuclear arms control efforts. China has all along advocated the ultimate goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. All nuclear-weapon States should earnestly fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, publicly undertake not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons, and conclude a legal instrument on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear disarmament should be pursued in a step-by-step manner, in keeping with the principles of maintenance of global strategic stability and undiminished security for all. China’s nuclear force is nowhere near that of the United States or Russia. In the current international security environment, it is not fair, reasonable, or realistic to ask China to participate at this stage in a so-called trilateral nuclear disarmament negotiation with the United States and Russia. States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to fulfill their special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and reduce their arsenals significantly and substantially in a verifiable, irreversible and legally binding manner in order to create conditions for the ultimate achievement of general and complete nuclear disarmament. All nuclear-weapon States should join the multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiation process when conditions are ripe.

16.Over the years, China has voted for a number of important resolutions at the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA), including Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons; nuclear disarmament; follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament; Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects; establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East; nuclear disarmament verification; nuclear war effects and scientific research; and group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verification.

17.China actively promotes the conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the no-first-use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States, submitted a draft treaty on the no-first-use of nuclear weapons to the other four nuclear-weapon States in January 1994, and has actively promoted the joint commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons with the other nuclear-weapon States on a bilateral or multilateral basis. In 2024, China submitted a working paper to the second session of the PreCom for the Eleventh NPT Review Conference on the No-first-use of Nuclear Weapons Initiative, supporting efforts to explore and conclude a treaty on “mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons” or issue a political statement in this regard.

18.China supports the CD in Geneva in reaching a comprehensive and balanced program of work and in commencing substantive work on such important issues as nuclear disarmament, security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (fissile material cut-off treaty, FMCT), and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

19.China firmly supports the aim and objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and has made significant progress in its domestic implementation preparations. China has all along abided by its moratorium on nuclear testing and has not engaged in any activity contrary to the provisions of the Treaty. China supports the early entry into force of the Treaty and international efforts in this regard. China has participated in all previous conferences to facilitate the entry into force of the Treaty. Since 2020, China has been the second largest financial contributor to the Treaty and has always paid its contributions to the Preparatory Commission in full and on time.

From 2023 to 2025, China hosted multiple visits by Dr. Robert Floyd, Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). The two sides had an in-depth exchange of views on the preparations for the implementation of the Treaty, the certification of monitoring stations, and other issues, jointly completed the certification of the Kunming infrasound station (IS16), and attended the launch ceremony for the certification of the auxiliary seismic stations in Xi’an and Shanghai.

20.In recent years, China has actively supported the building of the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and a number of monitoring stations in China have been certified. China has undertaken the construction of 11 monitoring stations and one radionuclide laboratory. All of the facilities have been completed except for the infrasound station in Beijing (IS15), as site selection is still under way. At present, the Lanzhou radionuclide station (RN21), the Beijing radionuclide station (RN20), the Guangzhou radionuclide station (RN22), the Hailar primary seismic station (PS12) and the Lanzhou primary seismic station (PS13) have been certified. In August 2025, the Kunming infrasound station (IS16) was certified. In October 2025, certification of the Xi’an and Shanghai auxiliary seismic stations was initiated.

21.China actively supports and is deeply involved in the work of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO. It has participated in all the meetings of the Preparatory Commission and its subsidiary working groups, and taken part in the negotiations on guiding documents including the International Monitoring System, the International Data Center, and the On-site Inspection Operational Manual.

22.China maintains good cooperation with the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO. In October 2024, the two sides co-hosted the 2024 National Data Center Workshop in Beijing to facilitate exchanges between national data centers. The Beijing Radionuclide Laboratory participated in the international sample comparisons and related technical workshops organized by the Provisional Technical Secretariat, and actively promoted the Laboratory’s certification process. China attaches great importance to capacity building of developing countries for compliance with the Treaty, and has made several donations to the Provisional Technical Secretariat since 2008 to support the participation of experts from developing countries in the activities of the Preparatory Commission.

23.China has all along advocated the negotiation and conclusion of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable FMCT within the CD, in accordance with the mandate of the Shannon report (CD/1299), which is helpful in promoting the nuclear disarmament process, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and maintaining international peace and security. As the sole multilateral negotiation forum on disarmament, the CD is the only appropriate venue for negotiating an FMCT.

24.China actively participates in the useful discussions on issues related to an FMCT in the relevant subsidiary bodies of the CD. China has played a constructive part in the U.N. high-level FMCT expert preparatory group, helping the group carry out its work as mandated by relevant resolutions and produce the report based on consensus.

25.Effective nuclear disarmament verification measures are conducive to enhancing the credibility of compliance with nuclear disarmament treaties, and could serve as an important guarantee for achieving the ultimate goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. At the same time, nuclear disarmament verification is notably complex and sensitive, involving delivery means, nuclear warheads, nuclear materials and related nuclear facilities and other aspects, and must be guided by the principles of balance, non-discrimination and non-proliferation. Verification measures should not be developed away from the specific treaties. Nor should the establishment of a universally applicable, unified verification template be pursued.

China supports the capacity-building efforts of the international community on nuclear disarmament verification. China participated constructively in the work of the two United Nations Groups of Governmental Experts on nuclear disarmament verification established pursuant to UNGA resolutions 71/67 and 74/50, and made positive contribution to their conclusion of reports. China attaches great importance to and actively promotes scientific and technological research and capacity building regarding nuclear disarmament verification, supports exploring the application of new technologies in this domain, encourages experts in related fields to participate in international academic exchanges and cooperation, and has conducted long-term, in-depth studies on verification concepts, theories, technical methodologies, mechanisms and procedures. China supports the establishment of the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification within the framework of the CD to further deepen international discussions on nuclear disarmament verification.

(iii)Transparency and confidence-building measures (CBMs)

26.Given the current international security situation, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security and renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States will provide important safeguards against the risk of nuclear war and embody the true value of transparency and CBMs. China firmly follows a path of peaceful development, pursues a nuclear strategy of self-defense, and unconditionally commits to a no-first-use policy. This is the most practical measure of transparency.

China maintains that nuclear transparency should contribute to enhancing strategic mutual trust, take into full account the security environment and interests of each country, and be implemented voluntarily in light of national conditions. Nuclear-weapon States differ in the size of nuclear forces, nuclear strategies and policies, and strategic security environment, resulting in different levels and focuses of transparency. The disclosure of security-sensitive information of certain states is detrimental to non-proliferation and nuclear security, and inappropriate transparency may also undermine strategic stability. Nuclear transparency must be guided by the principles of maintenance of global strategic stability and undiminished security for all. Nuclear-weapon States should increase transparency on an incremental and voluntary basis, in light of their respective security environment and national realities.

27.In recent years, China has publicly declared its nuclear policy through a series of government documents, maintaining a high degree of transparency. Since 1995, China has issued four white papers on arms control and non-proliferation, with the latest edition titled China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-proliferation in the New Era released in November 2025. Between 1998 and 2019, China issued ten white papers on national defense. In the above-mentioned documents, China has clearly articulated its nuclear strategy, as well as nuclear and nuclear arms control policies.

28.On September 3, 2025, China solemnly commemorated the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, and unveiled its land-, sea- and air-based strategic forces as the nuclear triad for the first time, including the JingLei-1 air-based long-range missile, the JuLang-3 submarine-launched intercontinental missile, the DongFeng-61 land-based intercontinental missile, the new-type DongFeng-31 land-based intercontinental missile and the DongFeng-5C liquid-fueled intercontinental strategic nuclear missile. It was stressed that China’s strategic forces are for defending the country’s sovereignty and national dignity.

29.From March 24 to 27, 2026, China hosted an international seminar in Beijing on Promoting Multilateralism and Advancing Arms Control Diplomacy and organized a visit to the decommissioned 816 nuclear facility in Chongqing by the permanent U.N. representatives, disarmament ambassadors and high-level representatives of nearly 20 countries. The construction of the facility had been finished 85 percent when it was suspended, demonstrating China’s determination to restrain the development of nuclear forces and its consistent stance of strictly following a self-defensive nuclear strategy and refraining from a nuclear arms race.

30.China has taken a series of actions in the area of confidence-building. China has actively participated in the activities under the P5 process and has been engaged in dialogue on subjects such as issues of concern in the field of nuclear policy and strategy and measures to reduce nuclear risks, so as to enhance transparency and mutual confidence.

31.At the bilateral level, China maintains various official channels of communication with the United States, Russia and other countries. In 2009, China and Russia signed the Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Russian Federation on Mutual Notification of Launches of Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles. On December 15, 2020, China and Russia signed a protocol extending the Agreement by 10 years. In September 2024 when China launched an intercontinental ballistic missile into the waters of the Pacific Ocean, prior notifications were sent to Russia, the United States and other countries.

32.China actively seeks to ensure that nuclear-weapon States do not target their nuclear weapons at each other. In September 1994, China and Russia signed a joint statement, declaring that they would not target their strategic nuclear weapons at each other. In June 1998, China and the United States declared that they would not target each other with the strategic nuclear weapons under their respective control. In May 2000, the five nuclear-weapon States, namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, issued a joint statement, declaring that their respective nuclear weapons would not be targeted at any country. In a joint statement in 2009, China and the United States reaffirmed their commitment not to target each other with their nuclear weapons. In 2022, the five nuclear-weapon States reiterated in a statement that they would not target nuclear weapons at one another or any other country.

33.China attaches importance to working with countries concerned to maintain global strategic stability. In June 2021, China and Russia issued a joint statement on the 20th anniversary of the signing of the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, stressing that a nuclear war cannot be won, should not be fought, and must never be launched. In May 2025, China and Russia issued the Joint Statement by the People’s Republic of China and the Russia Federation on Global Strategic Stability. In November 2024, the heads of state of China and the United States jointly affirmed the need to address the risks of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, enhance AI safety, strengthen international cooperation and promote AI for good and for all. The two heads of state affirmed the need to maintain human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons and stressed the need to give serious consideration to potential risks and develop AI technologies in the military field in a prudent and responsible manner.

34.China actively carries out arms control and non-proliferation consultations. Since 2022, China has held arms control and non-proliferation consultations with countries including Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, Pakistan, Israel, Indonesia, Brazil and Finland and with international and regional organizations including the United Nations and the European Union, to present China’s policies, positions and practices on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and to exchange views on the NPT review process and other international security and arms control issues of common concern.

35.China attaches great importance to the P5 process and maintains dialogue and consultations with the other four states on such issues as CBMs and the implementation of the NPT. In January 2019, China hosted the Beijing P5 Conference to restart the deadlocked cooperation process. In January 2022, with China’s contribution, the Joint Statement of Leaders of the Five nuclear-weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races was issued. Acting as the coordinator and working with the other P5 members, China helped put out two editions of the P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, contributing to greater consensus and mutual trust and preventing miscalculation among the five states and providing a helpful reference for the international community. From August 2024 to August 2025, China acted as the coordinator of the P5 process for another term. During the period, China promoted greater nuclear policy communication and strategic mutual trust among the five states to re-energize the mechanism, and convened a P5 experts’ meeting in Dubai in December 2024. The parties had an open communication on nuclear policy, strategic risks and other issues and recognized it as a timely and helpful discussion that was instrumental in promoting the understanding of each other’s nuclear policies and avoiding misperception and miscalculation. China also hosted online and offline meetings of the five states under the Expert Level Track and the Young Professional Network.

(iv)Other related issues

36.The issue of missile defense concerns global strategic balance and stability, regional peace and security, and the strategic mutual trust among major countries, and is closely linked to the nuclear disarmament process. China believes that unrestrained development of the global missile defense system and forward deployment is an attempt to gain both offensive and defensive strategic advantages, and it seriously undermines global strategic stability, stokes war urges and increases strategic risks. China believes that it is essential to view strategic deterrence and strategic defense in a comprehensive manner, uphold the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security, reject the offensive missile defense policy, stop the development of the global missile defense system detrimental to strategic stability and cease the forward deployment of strategic weapons.

In January 2025, the United States launched the “Golden Dome” program to establish an unconstrained, global, deeply layered and multi-domain missile defense system. This is a complete and thorough rejection of the central principle of the inseparable interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms. The program seeks left-of-launch defeat of missile weapons. It seriously undermines global strategic stability. The “Golden Dome” program also directly seeks to largely increase means of warfare in outer space, deploy orbital interceptor systems in outer space, and exacerbate the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space. This contravenes the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty, which states that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes.

37.China expresses its grave concern at the relevant country’s practices of shirking special and primary responsibilities for nuclear disarmament, and developing, deploying and proliferating land-based intermediate-range missile systems. China urges the country concerned to cease pushing for the forward deployment and proliferation of land-based intermediate-range missiles and take practical actions to maintain global and regional peace and stability. All of China’s land-based intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles are deployed within its own territory and are used exclusively for defense purposes, thus posing no threat to global strategic stability or to any country.

38.China is committed to the peaceful use of outer space, actively advocates the prevention of the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space, and actively promotes a multilateral approach to outer space arms control. In the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in February 2008, China and Russia formally submitted a draft treaty on prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects (CD/1839), and actively promoted discussion of this issue in the CD. In June 2014, China and Russia jointly submitted an updated text of that draft treaty to the CD (CD/1985). In 2022, with contribution from China and Russia, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution to establish the Group of Governmental Experts on Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. In August 2024, the Group of Experts agreed on the substantial elements of a legally-binding instrument on outer space arms control and finalized its report. China supports transparency and CBMs in outer space. China advocates the building of a community with a shared future for humanity in the field of outer space. This vision has been included in U.N. General Assembly resolutions related to outer space security for nine consecutive years and gained widespread recognition of the international community.

II.National measures relating to nuclear non-proliferation

39.China firmly opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons and advocates the full, faithful and balanced fulfillment of all obligations under the NPT and the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. China has always strictly honored its international nuclear non-proliferation obligations, fully implemented the relevant Security Council resolutions in their entirety, actively participated in international non-proliferation cooperation and promoted the political and diplomatic settlement of regional nuclear hotspot issues. Over the years, China has gradually established and enhanced a non-proliferation and export control system to ensure the effective implementation of relevant laws and regulations. On January 15, 2026, the Atomic Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China entered into force, stipulating that China shall abide by its obligations under the international treaties it has concluded or acceded to and shall oppose and prohibit all forms of nuclear proliferation.

(i)Safeguards

40.China attaches importance to the role of IAEA safeguards in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ensuring the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by all countries, and supports the strengthening of the efficiency and effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. Meanwhile, China believes that the safeguards regime should be premised on impartiality and objectivity.

41.China joined the IAEA in 1984. In 1988, China and the IAEA signed the Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in China. In December 1998, China signed the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, which entered into force in March 2002. China was the first nuclear-weapon state to bring the Additional Protocol into force.

42.China actively supports and cooperates with the IAEA in the implementation of relevant safeguards measures. At present, China has submitted 30 nuclear facilities for IAEA safeguards, including pressurized water reactors, a heavy water reactor, research reactors, a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor, a uranium enrichment plant and a nuclear fuel element production line.

43.In 2007, China joined the Nuclear Safeguards Support Program of the member states of the IAEA, and has formally undertaken research and development work on safeguards verification tools and methods. China has also supported the IAEA’s research and development projects on the concept of safeguards, producing fruitful research outcomes in the evaluation of uncertainties in the measurement of nuclear material and other fields. China joined the IAEA network of safeguards analytical laboratories (NWAL), actively undertaking sample analysis tasks. Following the IAEA’s selection of China’s demonstration project of the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor for the application of safeguards, the two sides jointly developed a safeguards program for this new-type commercial reactor, which has contributed significantly to the enhancement of IAEA safeguards capabilities.

44.China attaches great importance to the training of safeguards professionals. The China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) and the IAEA established a Joint Training Center on Nuclear Safeguards and Security for training and technical support in the fields of safeguards verification and the accounting for and control of nuclear materials. China has actively organized experts to attend international conferences on nuclear safeguards held by the IAEA to share knowledge and experience. It has also established domestic platforms for the exchange of nuclear safeguards compliance practices and organized regular technical seminars and experience sharing, so as to continuously enhance nuclear safeguards compliance capabilities.

(ii)Export control

45.China has all along firmly opposed the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, and has continuously promoted the rule of law in non-proliferation and export control. A system of laws and regulations was established centered on its Export Control Law, covering nuclear, biological, chemical, missile and other sensitive items and technologies, as well as military products. License management, administrative law enforcement and compliance development were conducted in line with international practice, ensuring law-based and standardized non-proliferation and export control.

46.The Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China officially came into effect in December 2020. The Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items, which came into force in December 2024, integrate and optimize regulations and rules on dual-use items, and establish a unified and clear system on the supervision and control of dual-use items. The Atomic Energy Law enacted in January 2026 clearly stipulates that management of nuclear imports and exports shall be strengthened, international obligations and commitments on imports and exports shall be fulfilled, exports of proliferation-sensitive items and materials that could be used for nuclear explosive devices shall be put under strict control, and the peaceful uses of imported and exported items shall be guaranteed.

47.China has strict control on its nuclear exports and has formulated three clear principles in this regard, namely such exports are to be used only for peaceful nonexplosive purposes, must comply with IAEA safeguards, and may not be transferred to any third party without prior consent of China. China has promulgated and implemented a series of laws and regulations such as the Atomic Energy Law, the Export Control Law, the Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Materials, the Regulations on Nuclear Export Control, and Regulations on the Administration Safeguards for Nuclear Import and Export and Nuclear Cooperation with Foreign Countries. China has continuously optimized license management and advanced compliance building so as to ensure effective control of nuclear export activities.

48.China is committed to promoting a fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory international non-proliferation export control order,supports the central role of the United Nations in non-proliferation and endeavors to strengthen non-proliferation capacity building. China attaches great importance to Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), actively participates in the work of the 1540 Committee, supports the resolution’s implementation at the national, regional and international levels, strengthens domestic management and export control over WMD and related materials and technologies, and prevents and combats the acquisition of sensitive items by non-state actors. To that end, China has co-hosted four training courses in China for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 Points of Contact in the Asia Pacific region, together with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the 1540 Committee.

49.China is vigilant to the proliferation risks posed by emerging science and technology. It is of the view that efforts to maintain international security and achieve non-proliferation objectives should not undermine the legitimate rights of developing countries to the peaceful uses of science and technology, and in particular, non-proliferation should not be used as a “decoupling” tool to abuse export control and impose unilateral sanctions. In 2021, together with like-minded countries, China submitted for the first time the draft resolution entitled “Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security” to the First Committee of the 76th session of the U.N. General Assembly, emphasizing the inalienable right of all states to participate in the fullest possible technology exchanges and cooperation for peaceful purposes under international law, and calling for the removal of undue restrictions on developing countries. The resolution received wide support. In 2024, at its 79th session, the General Assembly again adopted this resolution by an overwhelming majority. China welcomes continued inclusive dialogues among all parties in the General Assembly to promote effective implementation of the resolution.

50.As a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), China always maintains that strengthening the universality, authority and effectiveness of the NPT should be the goal of and the criterion for NSG’s work. China has promoted serious and responsible discussions among member states regarding criteria for expansion. China actively participates in the discussions on revising and refining NSG’s guidelines for transfer and lists of control in order to address the proliferation risks posed by technological developments, while ensuring international scientific and technological exchanges and trade in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology. China actively supports NSG’s outreach activities and greater exchanges with non-member-parties, the business community and academia.

(iii)Nuclear security

51.China upholds a rational, coordinated and balanced approach to nuclear security. While continuously strengthening its nuclear security capacity building and reinforcing political commitment and national responsibility, China is actively engaged in international cooperation on nuclear security to promote the development of a fair, cooperative and mutually beneficial international nuclear security system, and build a community with a shared future on nuclear security.

52.The Chinese government has actively acceded to relevant conventions on nuclear security and strictly complied with its international obligations. China acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1989, and ratified the amended Convention in 2008, improving its national nuclear security system as required by the Convention and its Amendment. Nuclear terrorism is an enemy of all humanity. China participated in the drafting of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, effectively preventing non-state entities from acquiring sensitive nuclear materials, promoting international cooperation to combat nuclear terrorism, and opposing all kinds of attack on peaceful nuclear facilities, including nuclear power plants. China actively supports and participates in international efforts to strengthen the management of radioactive sources and is committed to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

53.China attaches great importance to its national responsibility for nuclear security and has integrated nuclear security into the overall national security system. A nuclear security legal and regulatory system that is compatible with the needs of the development of its nuclear industry and consistent with its obligations under international conventions has been established. China has vigorously promoted nuclear security capacity building, including upgrading the physical protection systems of old nuclear facilities, supporting nuclear material accountancy and innovation and R&D of physical protection technologies, organizing regular force-on-force exercises on nuclear security, and strengthening nuclear security supervision and inspection, personnel training and cultural development.

54.China supports the IAEA in playing the central role in the international nuclear security process. Since 2011, China has made contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund for 15 consecutive years to support nuclear security capacity building in countries in the Asia Pacific region. In 2023, China provided 200,000 euros of extra budgetary contributions to the IAEA to support its technical assistance to Ukraine on nuclear safety and security. In 2024, China donated a batch of nuclear security equipment worth 490,000 euros as in-kind contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Center in Seibersdorf. In cooperation with the IAEA, China has set up the Collaborating Center for Nuclear Security Technologies, and the Collaboration Center for Nuclear Security First Line Officers Capacity Building in the country, providing training programs to more than 3,000 nuclear security personnel from IAEA member states and contributing to the improvement of nuclear security capabilities in the region and the world at large.

55.China actively promotes bilateral nuclear security cooperation with relevant countries. At the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. in 2016, the presidents of China and the United States issued a joint statement on nuclear security cooperation between China and the U.S., and the China-U.S. Center of Excellence (COE) on Nuclear Security completed construction and started operation. By the end of 2025, China and the U.S. had held 39 consultations on COE cooperation and five Track 2 dialogues on nuclear security. Over the past 10 years, the two countries have organized over 300 various types of nuclear security exchange and cooperation events through the COE, engaging over 12,000 participants from China, the U.S. and neighboring countries. At the same time, China also attaches great importance to exchanges and cooperation on nuclear security with other countries. China held its first nuclear security dialogue with Russia in February 2018, and has established nuclear security exchange mechanisms with a number of countries in the Asia Pacific region.

56.China actively fulfills its political commitment to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU). In March 2016, China successfully completed the highly enriched uranium-to-low enriched uranium (LEU) conversion at the China Institute of Atomic Energy. In August 2017 and December 2018, in cooperation with relevant countries within the framework of the IAEA, China completed the HEU-to-LEU conversion of miniature neutron source reactors (MNSRs) in Ghana and Nigeria. Such technological conversion has reduced the proliferation risks of the MNSRs while enhancing its safety and security. By doing so, China has actively supported relevant countries in advancing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. China stands ready to continue to assist other countries in the HEU-to-LEU conversion of MNSRs.

(iv)Nuclear-weapon-free zones

57.China believes that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is conducive to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as to the establishment of a balanced, effective and sustainable regional security architecture and the attainment of universal and common security. China respects and supports the efforts of countries and regions concerned in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. China abides by its unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

58.China has signed and ratified all protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties that are open for signature, including Additional Protocol Ⅱ to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, Protocols Ⅱ and Ⅲ to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Protocols I and Ⅱ to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. China has also acceded to the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. China voted in favor of the resolution entitled “Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects” adopted by the General Assembly at its 79th session in 2024. A Chinese expert was invited to contribute substantively to the work of the U.N.’s group of experts on nuclear-weapon-free zones.

59.China has participated in the activities marking the 45th and 50th anniversaries of the opening for signature of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and, as an observer state, has participated in all sessions of the general conference of Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. During these sessions, China reiterated its support for the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone and presented China’s policy of supporting the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and upholding the NPT.

60.China always firmly supports the establishment of the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone and completed the ratification and deposit of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia in April 2015. China stands ready to continue deepening its cooperation with relevant countries on this issue, safeguard the purposes and objectives of the Treaty and its Protocol and promote peace and security in Central Asia and beyond.

61.China always firmly supports the establishment of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone. In October 2021 and October 2024, China attended the fifth and sixth Conferences of States Parties to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and reaffirmed that it would continue to faithfully implement its obligations under the Additional Protocols to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and actively support the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Africa.

62.China always firmly supports the establishment of the Southeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone (SEANWFZ). In November 2021, in the Joint Statement of the China-ASEAN Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations, China stated that it supports ASEAN’s efforts to preserve South-East Asia as a region free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, while contributing to global efforts on disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In August 2025, the Plan of Action to Implement the China-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2026-2030) noted that in recent years China had been discussing with ASEAN the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on the SEANWFZ and that China supports ASEAN’s efforts to preserve the SEANWFZ.

63.China always firmly supports the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. From 2019 to 2025, China participated constructively as an observer in six Conferences on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Beijing Declaration issued at the 10th Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum in May 2024 and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027) adopted by the FOCAC Beijing Summit in September 2024 both emphasized China’s support for all efforts to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In May 2025, the Chinese government submitted to the United Nations its position paper on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. China calls on all relevant parties to increase diplomatic coordination and take practical measures toward an early agreement on the arrangements for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. China is ready to continue its contributions toward this goal.

64.China respects and welcomes Mongolia’s status as a non-nuclear-weapon state and supports the relevant resolutions adopted at previous sessions of the U.N. General Assembly. In 2000, China, together with the other four nuclear-weapon States, issued a joint statement committing themselves to providing Negative Security Assurances to Mongolia. In 2012, China, together with the other four nuclear-weapon States, issued another statement reaffirming their support for Mongolia’s status as a non-nuclear-weapon state and their Negative Security Assurances to it. China is ready to continue working with all parties to maintain Mongolia’s status as a non-nuclear-weapon state.

(v)Compliance and other relevant matters

65.China attaches great importance to the role of the NPT as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. It calls upon countries not party to the Treaty to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States as soon as possible. It also supports the efforts of the international community to refine the measures to be taken in dealing with withdrawal

and raise the appropriate threshold for withdrawal while properly handling differences.

66.The issue of safeguards for nuclear submarine propulsion reactors and relevant nuclear materials in non-nuclear-weapon States concerns the integrity and effectiveness of the NPT. China proposes that the IAEA establish a special committee open to all to discuss the political, legal and technical issues of the application of safeguards to nuclear submarine propulsion reactors and relevant nuclear materials in non-nuclear-weapon States and report its recommendations to the Board of Governors and the General Conference of the Agency.

67.The cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia have decided to conduct involves the transfer of large quantities of weapons-grade enriched uranium to a non-nuclear-weapon state. It poses a serious risk of nuclear proliferation, violates the objectives and purposes of the NPT and undermines regional peace and stability. China is deeply concerned and firmly opposed to this. The current IAEA safeguards system does not provide effective safeguards for nuclear submarine propulsion reactors and relevant nuclear materials to be transferred from the United States and the United Kingdom to Australia, and therefore can not ensure that the relevant nuclear materials are not diverted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Before consensus is reached by all states parties, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia should not proceed with nuclear submarine cooperation, and the IAEA Secretariat should not have consultation with the three countries on the safeguards arrangement for their nuclear submarine cooperation.

68.China closely follows developments regarding the cooperation between the ROK and the United States on nuclear-powered submarines announced in November 2025. China hopes that the two sides will practice prudence, manage relevant safeguards issues properly, effectively implement their international nuclear non-proliferation obligations, do more things conducive to regional peace and stability and avoid any cooperation targeting a third party.

69.The flagrant statement by an official at the Japanese Prime Minister’s Office that “Japan should possess nuclear weapons” challenges the fundamental principles upheld by the international community. Japan’s right-wing forces publicly called for a revision of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. These statements are a blatant provocation to the post-World War II international order and the nuclear non-proliferation regime and a serious threat to regional and global peace and stability. The international community must be vigilant and firmly opposed to the rhetoric. The international nuclear non-proliferation regime is an important component of the post-war international order. The pursuit of nuclear weapons by Japan’s right-wing forces is a serious provocation to the authority and effectiveness of the NPT. It will undermine the joint efforts by all countries to uphold the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the hard-won peace and prosperity since World War II. As a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, Japan must fully abide by the provisions on non-receiving, non-production, non-possession and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. These are the obligations Japan must fulfill under international law. China and other peace-loving countries around the world should be highly vigilant and firmly opposed to Japan’s dangerous tendency on the issue of nuclear weapons, and strongly urge Japan to abide by its obligations under international law and stop the attempts and provocations on the nuclear possession issue.

(vi)Other contributions to non-proliferation

70.China always handles non-proliferation issues with a great sense of responsibility. It has participated actively in international non-proliferation cooperation and made robust efforts to promote the resolution of regional nuclear issues. China believes that countries should stop the zero-sum game and abandon the Cold War mentality, fully respect the legitimate security concerns of all countries and eliminate the root causes of nuclear weapons proliferation. All countries should commit themselves to safeguarding the authority and effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, reject the practice of utilitarianism and double standards, and resolve proliferation concerns peacefully through political and diplomatic means within the framework of the current international law.

71.China holds a just position on the Korean Peninsula issue and works in the right direction. China is committed to promoting peace, stability and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and to the process of a political settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue. China calls on relevant parties to stop making threats or applying pressure, restart dialogue and negotiation and play a constructive role in promoting a political settlement and achieving lasting peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.

72.China is committed to playing a constructive role in the political, diplomatic and peaceful settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. China opposes the use of force and sanctions and any form of attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities. China supports Iran’s legitimate right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and notes that Iran has repeatedly reiterated its intention not to develop nuclear weapons. China facilitated the conclusion of the JCPOA in July 2015, supports the IAEA to carry out monitoring and verification in Iran and has contributed a total of RMB 18.1 million to the Agency. In March 2025, China held the Beijing Meeting Between China, Russia and Iran on the Iranian nuclear issue, and made the five-point proposition for a proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, which helped to facilitate a resumption of dialogue and negotiation between the United States and Iran. In September, Ministers of Foreign Affairs of China, Russia and Iran sent a joint letter to the secretary general of the United Nations and the president of its Security Council, stressing the legal and procedural flaws in the snapback mechanism advocated by the United Kingdom, France and Germany.

73.The unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA is the root cause of the current tensions surrounding the Iranian nuclear issue. The United States and Israel launched military strikes against Iran in June 2025 and February 2026, gravely violating international law and the purposes of the U.N. Charter. The attacks by the United States and Israel on Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards undermined the international nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the NPT. China calls for an immediate stop of military operations and urges against further sanctions, incitement to confrontation, and abusing the powers of the Security Council to impose unilateral punishments on Iran. The parties concerned should demonstrate political sincerity, make greater diplomatic efforts, and bring the Iranian nuclear issue back to the right track of dialogue and negotiation.

III.National measures relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

74.The Atomic Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China stipulates that, “the state supports the peaceful uses of atomic energy, encourages international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and promotes the sharing of the results of the peaceful uses of atomic energy,” which provides legal guarantees for the implementation of the GDI, the GSI, the GCI and the GGI in the field of atomic energy.

75.China supports the right of all countries, particularly developing countries, to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and believes that non-proliferation should not be used as a pretext to undermine their legitimate rights. China attaches great importance to the contribution of nuclear energy to social and economic development, promotes technological research and industrial development and application for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, actively participates in and supports international cooperation to promote the development of nuclear energy and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy worldwide, and complies with its relevant international obligations.

(i)Promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

76.China is committed to jointly building a clean and beautiful world and to promoting nuclear energy’s active role in building a beautiful China. For more than half a century, China has developed a full-fledged nuclear industrial system, which has made nuclear energy widely used in areas such as energy, medicine, industry and public safety, facilitating social and economic development.

77.Nuclear power, as a green, low-carbon and clean energy, plays an important role in China’s efforts to build a clean and efficient energy system, address the challenges of climate change, and achieve the targets of carbon peak and carbon neutrality. China advocates the active and orderly development of nuclear power on the premise of ensuring safety. As of the end of December 2025, 59 nuclear power units were in operation on the Chinese mainland, with a total installed capacity of 62.48 million kilowatts, and 53 nuclear power units were under construction or to be approved, with a total installed capacity of 62.93 million kilowatts. Over the past 10 years, China’s newly grid-connected nuclear power capacity accounts for nearly 60 percent of the global total. China leads the world in achieving mass commercial operation of third-generation nuclear power units, and boasts the fastest growth and largest-scale construction of nuclear power in the globe, making important contributions to the recovery of nuclear energy and response to climate change worldwide.

78.China has accumulated rich experience and technology in the design, construction and operation of nuclear power, and actively promotes research on and the development and application of safer and more advanced nuclear energy technologies on that foundation.

●Eight units of the Hualong-1, the third-generation nuclear power technology independently designed by China, have been built and put into operation at home and abroad, achieving large-scale deployment.

●China’s high-temperature gas-cooled reactor demonstration project, with the features of the fourth-generation advanced nuclear energy system, entered commercial operation in Shidao Bay, Shandong Province, in December 2023.

●China is advancing the construction of Linglong-1, the commercial land-based small modular reactor, and will put it into operation soon.

●China is actively promoting the research and development of controllable nuclear fusion technology. It has built large fusion experimental devices such as the Experimental Advanced Superconducting Tokamak (EAST) and Huanliu-3 (HL-3), and achieved high-parameter, long-pulse, high-confinement mode plasma operation.

●China actively participates in the international big science project of the Thermonuclear Fusion Experimental Reactor (ITER), and has implemented the design and manufacturing of 18 key components and systems, as well as the installation of core equipment, with high quality. Chinese enterprises took the lead in completing the ITER superconducting magnet manufacturing task, delivering the first large-scale component of the ITER project with high quality, and successfully manufacturing and delivering the world’s first ultra-large unconventional converter power system.

79.China vigorously promotes nuclear technology for the well-being of its people and the socio-economic development of the country, and has built a relatively complete nuclear technology industrial system. In October 2024, the CAEA and other ministries jointly published the Three-Year Plan for High-Quality Development of Nuclear Technology Application Industry (2024-2026). Currently, the annual direct economic output value of China’s nuclear technology application industry has exceeded RMB 300 billion yuan.

●In the field of industry, highly molecular materials such as high-quality cables and tires are optimized and modified through irradiation technology. China’s irradiation sterilization industry ranks among the top globally in terms of scale, and its radiographic non-destructive testing and industrial flaw detection technologies have reached the world-class level.

●In the field of agriculture, China operates over 1,000 radiation mutation breeding programs, accounting for one-third of the global total, and adding nearly 15 million tons to the country’s grain, cotton, and oil production annually. Irradiation processing is used for 1.73 million tons of agricultural products and food per year, accounting for more than two-thirds of the global total.

●In the medical field, the technical capabilities in the production of cobalt-60 medical isotopes and radiopharmaceuticals, as well as nuclear medical equipment, have rapidly improved.

●In environmental protection, technologies such as radiation measurement and elemental analysis in environmental monitoring and governance are playing a more prominent role. The industrial model of using electronic beam technology to treat printing and dyeing, medical, chemical waste water and waste residue is becoming more mature.

●In public security, technologies such as radiation imaging, computed tomography, and Raman spectroscopy are widely used for security check at important transportation hubs and border ports, as well as for the security of critical infrastructure in national defense, energy, finance and other sectors. They have played a crucial role in the security of large-scale public events such as the Beijing Winter Olympics.

80.China attaches great importance to sharing its experience and cooperating with countries committed to the development of nuclear energy on the premise of nuclear non-proliferation. China has signed intergovernmental cooperation agreements on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with more than 30 countries and regions. On this basis, China and these countries jointly carry out mutually beneficial cooperation in technology exchange, talent cultivation, engineering and construction, and production capacity investment.

81.The Chinese government actively supports multilateral cooperation and exchanges that contribute to the development of nuclear technology and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. China is a member state of the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) and the ITER Organization (ITERO). China and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/NEA) have signed a Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. China also actively participates in regional cooperation mechanisms such as the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA).

82.China is committed to more just and equitable global nuclear energy governance, and works to make nuclear energy development more universally beneficial and inclusive and nuclear energy cooperation more open and orderly. Since 2019, China, in cooperation with international organizations such as the IAEA, has hosted important international conferences in China, including the International Conference on Nuclear Data, International Conference on Nuclear Engineering, International Conference on Enhancing the Operational Safety of Nuclear Power Plants, Interregional Workshop on Technology Applications and Development for Small Modular Reactors, Ministerial Meeting of the World Fusion Energy Group and International Conference on Fusion Energy, making positive contributions to international experience sharing, cooperation and exchange on nuclear energy development and safety.

83.Since 2022, China has successively held the China-ASEAN Forum on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology, the China-GCC Forum on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology, announced the establishment of the China-Africa Forum on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology, and shared the good practices of applying nuclear science and technology in fields such as food and agriculture, healthcare, industrial upgrading, energy transformation, and public safety with countries in the Global South, empowering modernization and sustainable development in the Global South.

84.China pursues both autonomous innovation and international cooperation for nuclear fusion development, and has made continuous breakthroughs in nuclear fusion physics, fusion reactor engineering design, key component development, core technology research and development, reaching the world-leading level on the whole. There are currently 13 devices in operation and 6 under construction in the field of nuclear fusion in China. In January 2025, the EAST of Hefei Institute of Physical Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, achieved steady-state long-pulse high-confinement mode plasma operation at 100 million degrees Celsius for 1,066 seconds. In May 2025, the HL-3 of the Southwestern Institute of Physics achieved operation with a plasma current of 1 million amperes, and ion and electron temperature both exceeding 100 million degrees Celsius.

85.Chinese nuclear fusion research institutions actively participate in nuclear fusion international cooperation initiatives oriented toward the whole world. In 2023, the Southwestern Institute of Physics announced the opening of HL-3 for international collaboration. In November 2025, the international scientific program of Burning Plasma, initiated by the Institute of Plasma Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, was launched. China invites scientists from all over the world to come to China to break new grounds with shared wisdom, and jointly pursue the dream of “artificial sun” energy.

(ii)Technical assistance to other member states through the IAEA

86.China strongly supports and actively participates in the technical cooperation activities of the IAEA to expand technical support and assistance to developing countries. Since 2020, China has been the second largest contributor to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund, with a contribution of €14.04 million in 2025, accounting for 14.675 percent in the year. By the end of 2025, China has contributed around US$130 million to the Fund, received over 6,000 visits by scholars from other countries for scientific research and training, and sent over 4,000 experts to provide services in the Global South countries.

87.China actively participates in nuclear science and technology exchanges and cooperation within the framework of the Regional Cooperative Agreement (RCA), and has provided an annual contribution of US$110,000 to support cooperation projects in the field of nuclear technology applications in the Asia Pacific.

China actively supports the Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories (ReNuAL) of the IAEA, and has provided a cumulative extra budgetary contribution of €2 million for laboratory infrastructure, equipment upgrading, and technical services to help developing member states improve their nuclear technology application level and capabilities.

China actively responded to the IAEA’s cooperation initiative of using nuclear and nuclear-derived technologies to assist developing countries in combating COVID. In 2022, through the tripartite cooperative model between China, the IAEA and recipient countries, China donated COVID testing equipment and materials worth about US$2 million to countries seriously affected by COVID.

China supports the IAEA’s Rays of Hope initiative, and worked with the IAEA between 2024 and 2025 to hold two training sessions for radiation medical physicists in African countries, cultivating professionals in the field of nuclear technology for cancer diagnosis and treatment.

88.China and the IAEA have jointly established a number of platforms in China, including the International Construction Training Center (ICTC), SMR Training Center, as well as China-IAEA Collaborating Centers on Geological Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste, Nuclear Agriculture, Sterile Insect Technology for the Control of Mosquitoes, Production and Application of Medical Isotopes, Radiopharmaceuticals, Marine Environmental Radiation Monitoring and Measurement, Research Reactor Decommissioning, and Controlled Nuclear Fusion Technology.

China is willing to fully leverage these platforms to provide all-round support for the peaceful uses and safe development of nuclear energy in developing countries through cooperation in R&D, experience sharing and personnel training.

89.China is committed to providing assistance to other emerging nuclear power countries and countries interested in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the best of its ability. In 2017, the CAEA and the Ministry of Education of China jointly initiated the China Atomic Energy Scholarship Program, which has so far funded 400 students from 46 developing countries to pursue master’s and doctoral degrees in nuclear engineering and nuclear-technology-related majors in China. Since 2021, China and the IAEA have jointly held short-term training programs at the China-IAEA Advanced Nuclear Energy Management School for five consecutive years, training more than 250 nuclear energy management talents for 36 emerging nuclear power countries.

90.In September 2024, China opened up and shared 12 nuclear research facilities and experimental platforms with countries of the Global South and the wider world, covering various fields such as nuclear basic research, material and component irradiation testing, isotope production and preparation, reactor thermal hydraulics, nuclear environment simulation and equipment testing, radioactive waste disposal, and nuclear fusion experimental research. China is ready to work with all parties to jointly build an open, fair, just, and nondiscriminatory international environment for scientific and technological development, share advantageous technology resource platforms such as nuclear technology R&D, testing, and engineering verification, and strengthen practical cooperation in joint R&D, scientific and technological exchanges, and talent cultivation.

(iii)Nuclear safety

91.China adheres to a rational, coordinated and balanced approach to nuclear safety and security, and a safety first nuclear power development policy. China has taken multipronged measures encompassing legal norms, administrative regulations, industry self-discipline, technical support, personnel support, cultural guidance, and public participation to build a stringent accountability system to ensure nuclear and radiation safety. China strictly fulfills international obligations and national responsibilities under the Convention on Nuclear Safety and Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

92.China has maintained a sound nuclear safety record for a long time and has never experienced any operational events at or above Level 2 under the international nuclear event classification. According to the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) comprehensive index, the proportion of nuclear power units with full marks and the comprehensive performance of operational safety have been among the top in the world for many years in a row. The safety level of nuclear technology utilization continues to improve, and public health and environmental safety are fully guaranteed. China has launched campaigns such as “Improving the Safety Management of Nuclear Power Operations” and “Improving the Safety and Quality of the Nuclear Power Industry,” and has established a unified national platform for feedback on the operation experience of nuclear power plants and research reactors. It has invited the IAEA to conduct international peer reviews including Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) and Operational Safety Review Team (OSART). The work of nuclear and radiation safety supervision and the level of nuclear power plant operation safety have been highly recognized by international experts.

93.China has established a rigorous system of nuclear safety regulations and standards. In January 2026, the Atomic Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China entered into force. Apart from this, China has enacted laws and regulations such as the Law on Nuclear Safety, the Law on the Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution, and the Regulations on the Safety Supervision and Management of Civilian Nuclear Facilities. China adheres to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, earnestly fulfills its international obligations and supports the IAEA in playing an active role in helping developing countries to improve their nuclear safety and security capabilities. The impact of nuclear safety incidents transcends national boundaries and all states need to participate in nuclear safety matters in an effort to build a community with a shared future on nuclear safety.

94.China has all along attached importance to nuclear emergency management. China has rolled out an array of regulations and departmental rules, such as the Regulations on the Emergency Management of Nuclear Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants, the National Nuclear Emergency Response Plan, and the Regulations for Nuclear Accident Emergency Response Exercises at Nuclear Power Plants. China has set up a national-level professional technical support center and a national-level professional rescue team for nuclear emergencies, regularly conducted integrated nuclear emergency response exercises, and put into operation a national technical support center for nuclear emergency response operations. China and the IAEA have established a nuclear and radiation emergency preparedness and response capacity-building center, organized two sessions of IAEA radiation emergency management schools and five special training and exchange programs for neighbouring countries on nuclear emergency response, and conducted exercises under the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

95.The Chinese government attaches great importance to the management of radioactive waste and has issued regulations such as the Regulations on the Safe Management of Radioactive Waste. The Chinese government embraces a new development philosophy featuring innovative, coordinated, green, and open development for all, and continuously strengthens radioactive waste management to ensure the safe and stable operation of radioactive waste disposal sites. China has now essentially established a full-process capability for the treatment and disposal of radioactive waste, fully mastered critical technologies for the decommissioning of megawatt-level research reactors, and made positive progress in the decommissioning of a number of old nuclear facilities such as uranium mining and research reactors. The overall safety of radioactive waste in China is under control, ensuring public health, environmental safety and the sustainable development of the nuclear industry. At the Eighth Review Conference of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in 2025, China received historic positive recognition of four good practices and six good performances.

96.China places emphasis on enhancing the public’s scientific understanding of nuclear energy. The Chinese government and enterprises have actively promoted public awareness of nuclear safety, emergency policies and regulations, and basic knowledge of nuclear science and technology, thus enhancing public confidence in the safety of nuclear energy. The disclosure of relevant information is made more open and transparent through press conferences, nuclear safety information disclosure platforms, social responsibility reports, white papers on security and development, and open day events. In 2019, China issued a white paper entitled “Nuclear Safety in China,” which provides a comprehensive account of China’s fundamental principles and policy propositions for nuclear safety, shares China’s vision and practices of nuclear safety regulation, and shows China’s determination and actions to advance the global nuclear safety governance process. Since 2013, China has organized 13 sessions of the National Nuclear Science Program entitled “The Light of Charm” with over six million participants.

97.China believes that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should serve the building of a community of life for man and nature and should not be at the expense of the natural environment and human health. The Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in Japan was one of the most serious nuclear accidents in human history. The discharge of the nuclear-contaminated water into the ocean affects the health of all humanity, the global marine environment and international public interest. On August 24, 2023, the government of Japan unilaterally started the discharge of nuclear-contaminated water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the ocean. As one of the most important stakeholders, China firmly opposes this irresponsible practice. China urges Japan to seriously respond to domestic and international concerns, credibly fulfill its commitments, ensure continuous international monitoring and independent sampling and monitoring by China and other stakeholders, and place the discharge of nuclear-contaminated water under strict international oversight.