I. In recent years, Japan has been making problematic remarks and moves regarding its possession of nuclear weapons. Some Japanese officials kept talking about revising the country’s three non-nuclear principles (namely not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons). On November 11, 2025, the Japanese Prime Minister stated in a Diet debate that she could not confirm whether the three non-nuclear principles would remain unchanged during the revision of Japan’s security policy. In December 2025, a senior official from the Prime Minister’s Office openly claimed that Japan should possess nuclear weapons, laying bare the nuclear ambition of Japan’s right-wing forces and challenging the bottom line of the international community. Japan has also been trying to enhance the so-called extended deterrence cooperation, eyeing nuclear-powered submarines and coveting the so-called nuclear sharing arrangements which could lead to the redeployment of nuclear weapons in Japan. The international community must remain highly vigilant of and firmly oppose these provocative words and actions designed to test the response of the international community.

Japan has long harbored the ambition to acquire nuclear weapons. It was already conducting secret research and development of nuclear weapons during World War II. In 2013, Japan’s leading right-wing voice Toshio Tamogami, a former chief of staff of Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force, laid out a detailed “three-phase, eight-step” strategy for the country to achieve independent nuclear armament within 20 years in his book Japan’s Nuclear Armament Plan. Today, Japan masters the reprocessing technology, possesses the technical capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium, owns operational reprocessing plant, and consistently manufactures and stockpiles plutonium far beyond civilian needs¹. This places Japan only inches away from crossing the nuclear threshold.

II. According to a number of international instruments with full legal effect under international law, including the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation, and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, Japan should be completely disarmed and shall not be permitted to maintain such industries as would enable the country to re-arm for war. Nuclear armament is obviously out of the question. As a non-nuclear-weapon Party to the NPT, Japan is obligated by international law to refrain from receiving, manufacturing, acquiring or transferring nuclear weapons.

Japan’s problematic statements and actions for possessing nuclear weapons seriously violate its international legal obligations. It has shown glaring hypocrisy on nuclear arms control, and more importantly, posed a grave challenge and blatant provocation to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime with the NPT as its cornerstone, the outcomes of the victory of World War II, and the post-war international order. This will undermine the authority and effectiveness of the NPT, compromise the collective effort by countries to safeguard the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and endanger the hard-won peace and prosperity following the victory of World War II. There has been a strong chorus of opposition from the international community and the Japanese society.

Japan has never thoroughly repented on its history of aggression during World War II, and in fact does not accept its status as a defeated country. There has been loud noise within Japan about overturning historical judgments. In recent years, Japan has been moving forward in revising its Three Security Documents including the National Security Strategy, and the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. It has been ramping up its military spending for 14 consecutive years, taking the defense budget to over 9 trillion yen in 2026. Japan has also opened the door to the export of offensive weapons. These developments signal an alarming resurgence of neo-militarism. Japan must draw lessons from history, make a clean break with neo-militarism, abide by its Constitution and the NPT, and cease all efforts toward remilitarization and nuclear armament. If the country is pushed by unchecked right-wing forces toward developing powerful offensive weapons and even nuclear weapons, it will wreak more havoc on the international community and gravely damage international peace, security and stability.

III. China calls on States Parties to the NPT to remain highly vigilant of and firmly oppose Japan’s possession of nuclear weapons, and suggests that the Review Conference:

a. Take seriously Japan’s dangerous inclination toward acquiring nuclear weapons and its practical and long-term adverse impact on the NPT, and take it as an important issue for full discussion and serious deliberation;

b. Urge the Japanese government to reaffirm its commitment to the NPT obligations and the three non-nuclear principles, not to seek nuclear weapons in any way, not to develop nuclear submarines, and not to seek the introduction and deployment of nuclear weapons within Japan’s territory;

c. Call for open, transparent and effective measures to redress Japan’s issue of great imbalance between the supply and demand of sensitive nuclear materials, establish a clear timetable and a roadmap, and promptly eliminate proliferation and nuclear security risks;

d. Request the IAEA to take into full account the words and actions of the States when applying safeguards, and adopt targeted approaches to increase the comprehensive safeguards and the intensity and frequency of verification measures on Japan, so as to ensure timely detection of Japan’s non-peaceful nuclear activities;

e. Call on all States Parties to consider Japan’s strong intention of seeking nuclear weapons, and thus to exercise caution when engaging in nuclear energy cooperation with Japan, so as to earnestly uphold the international nuclear non-proliferation regime;

f. Urge the Japanese government to responsibly and properly handle the issue of the discharge of the Fukushima nuclear-contaminated water into the ocean, which concerns the health of all humanity, the global marine environment and the international public interest. Japan must fulfill its commitments faithfully, ensure the continuous participation of stakeholder countries in independent sampling and monitoring under the IAEA framework, and place the discharge of nuclear-contaminated water into the ocean under strict long-term international supervision.

¹ According to the Status Report of Plutonium Management in Japan 2024, which was released by Japan’s Office of Atomic Energy Policy of the Cabinet Office in August 2025, as of the end of 2024, the total amount of separated plutonium both managed within and outside Japan was approximately 44.4 tons, approximately 8.6 tons of which was held domestically and the rest of approximately 35.8 tons was held abroad, including 21.7 tons in the United Kingdom and 14.1 tons in France. In addition, Japan’s stockpiled spent fuel contains 191 tons of unseparated plutonium.