The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime, and an indispensable part of the post-World War II international security architecture. In over fifty years, NPT has made enormous contribution to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, significantly decreasing the risk of nuclear war, setting the framework for progress on nuclear disarmament, promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, and advancing the security, development and prosperity of all countries and peoples around the world.

Against the backdrop of today’s severe and complex security situation, it is in the common interests of all States Parties to continue to uphold the purposes and objectives of the NPT. China encourages all Parties to participate constructively in the 11th Review Conference, advancing discussions on the three pillars of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a comprehensive and balanced manner, so as to earnestly uphold the authority, validity and universality of the NPT.

China has submitted several working papers to the three Sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference (RevCon), including: Reducing Nuclear Risks, Initiative of No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons, Negative Security Assurances, Nuclear Arms Control, AUKUS, Issue of Japan’s Discharge of Nuclear Contaminated Water from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant into the Ocean, and Give Full Play to the Role of the NPT in Promoting Peace and Development in the New Era. China hopes the RevCon will hold in-depth discussions on the above-mentioned propositions, form consensus and incorporate them into the final document. In light of the latest developments, China proposes including the following elements in the final document:

I. Nuclear Disarmament and Preventing Nuclear War

1. Call on all States Parties to strengthen their collective commitment to preventing nuclear war and nuclear conflict on the basis of previous consensus. Welcome the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Race issued in January 2022, underscore the principle that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Recognize the important role of the Joint Statement in promoting mutual trust among the N5, avoiding misunderstanding and miscalculation, and preventing the escalation of tensions. Support the N5 in implementing the Joint Statement on the basis of mutual respect and equality.

2. As a logical first step to implement the Joint Statement, nuclear-weapon States should reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national and collective security policies, abandon the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons and the weakening of the security of other countries, commit to adopting the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and negotiate and conclude a treaty on mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons or issue a political statement to that effect.

3. Support the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in conducting substantive work on the early negotiations and the conclusion of an international legal instrument on security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free-zones.

4. Firmly observe the principle of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all and advance nuclear disarmament in a gradual and step-by-step manner. nuclear-weapon States should commit to honoring in good faith the obligations under Article VI of the NPT, abide by the consensus on nuclear disarmament reached at the previous RevCons, and explicitly promise not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons.

5. Express concerns over the expiration of New START Treaty, and call on the United States to positively consider Russia’s proposal that the two countries continue to voluntarily observe the Treaty’s central quantitative restrictions and handle the follow-up arrangements in a responsible manner. Stress that countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should earnestly fulfill their special and primary responsibilities for nuclear disarmament and continue to make further reductions in their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible and legally-binding manner, so as to create the conditions for other nuclear-weapon States to join the nuclear disarmament process.

6. Emphasize the inseparable internal connection between offensive strategic forces and defensive strategic forces in maintaining strategic stability, express concern over the expiration of arms control legal instruments such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and urge the relevant country to stop developing and deploying missile defense systems that damage global strategic stability.

7. Call on the States Parties to actively support the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, stop making remarks supporting the resumption of nuclear testing, and promote the early entry into force of the Treaty. Before the Treaty comes into force, all nuclear-weapon States should continue to honor their commitment to the moratorium on nuclear testing.

8. Reiterate that the CD is the only appropriate forum for negotiating a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Support the CD in launching relevant negotiation on the basis of a comprehensive and balanced Programme of Work reached by consensus, in accordance with CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.

9. Support nuclear-weapon States in exploring equal nuclear transparency measures on a voluntary basis and without prejudice to their national security, so as to enhance strategic mutual trust. Urge the non-nuclear-weapon States participating in nuclear sharing arrangements to take corresponding nuclear transparency responsibilities. Stress that there are no universally applicable nuclear transparency or risk reduction measures.

II. Nuclear Non-Proliferation

10. Pursue the peaceful resolution of regional nuclear issues through political and diplomatic means, and oppose the arbitrary use of or threat to use force. Call for abandoning the practice of double standards, the indiscriminate imposition of illegal unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction. Oppose undermining international treaties and arrangements in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, and oppose putting geopolitical self-interests above nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

11. Express concern over the illegal military strikes launched by the United States, a NPT depositary state, without the mandate of the U.N. Security Council on Iran’s nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has set a dangerous precedent of solving nuclear non-proliferation issue by force, and undermined the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States on NPT and IAEA safeguards. Call on relevant parties to reach a negotiated solution that accommodates the reasonable concerns of all parties, and aligns with NPT rights and obligations.

12. The States Parties to the NPT should pursue nuclear policies that comply with Treaty obligations. Call on relevant nuclear-weapon States to abolish the arrangements of nuclear sharing and extended deterrence as soon as possible, withdraw all their nuclear weapons deployed overseas back to their own countries, and refrain from deploying nuclear weapons or building new infrastructure in non-nuclear-weapon States.

13. All countries participating in the arrangements of nuclear sharing and extended deterrence should take concrete measures to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national and collective security policies, including avoiding any upgrading of current arrangements, refraining from conducting nuclear exercises or exchanging nuclear information, and not replicating new arrangements of nuclear sharing and extended deterrence.

14. Support the IAEA in fulfilling its safeguard function following the principle of objectivity, justice and impartiality, promote the universality of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and encourage relevant States to voluntarily join the Additional Protocols. Call on States that have not yet joined the NPT to do so as non-nuclear-weapon States as soon as possible, and to place all their nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the IAEA.

15. Call for approaching nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a balanced manner. No measure aiming to prevent nuclear proliferation shall impede the legitimate rights of all States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially those of developing countries. At the same time, no proliferation activity shall be carried out under the pretext of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Attention should be paid to the severe imbalance between supply and demand of nuclear materials in Japan, international supervision and verification should be strengthened over Japan’s nuclear activities, and effective measures should be adopted to redress them.

16. Express concern that the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine cooperation violates the objectives and purposes of the NPT, poses grave risks of nuclear proliferation, and deals a blow to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and that the IAEA’s existing safeguards system cannot place effective safeguards. Support discussing the safeguards issues involved in the above-mentioned cooperation through a transparent, open and inclusive intergovernmental process under the NPT review process and the IAEA framework, and making a decision by consensus.

17. Call on nuclear-weapon States not to transfer weapons-grade nuclear material, technology or equipment for military purposes to non-nuclear-weapon States.

18. Continue to promote the political settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue, and explore effective ways to address the concerns of all parties in a balanced manner. Relevant countries should take concrete steps to assume their due responsibilities, abandon the practice of resorting to sanctions and pressure, and take real actions to demonstrate their sincerity to ease tensions and safeguard peace and stability on the Peninsula.

19. Nuclear-weapon States should respect the legal status of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and sign and ratify as soon as possible the protocols of all treaties of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.

20. Reaffirm the importance of comprehensively and effectively implementing the relevant decisions and resolutions regarding the establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. Urge the relevant Nuclear-Weapon States and regional countries to actively participate in the U.N. Conference on Establishing a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

III. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

21. Reaffirm the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is an inalienable right of all countries. Reject the politicization of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the imposition of any inappropriate restrictions on Global South countries, and the disruption of and restriction on normal international cooperation. Oppose any country using non-proliferation as an excuse to draw ideological lines, overstretch the concept of national security, and use export controls as a tool for decoupling and severing supply chains.

22. Call on States Parties to jointly implement the Resolution entitled Promoting International Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security (A/RES/79/80) adopted at the 79th session of the U.N. General Assembly, take concrete measures to fulfill obligations and commitments regarding peaceful uses, continue dialogue on promoting peaceful uses and related international cooperation, and explore the formulation of guiding principles.

23. Support the Atoms for Global South initiative and the continued central role of the IAEA in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Capable countries are encouraged to continue and further increase assistance to developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including funding, technology and personnel.

24. Make all efforts to ensure the security of peaceful nuclear facilities and oppose armed attacks on peaceful nuclear installations including nuclear power plants. Reiterate that the Convention on Nuclear Safety shall be strictly complied with to avoid man-made nuclear accidents. The decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on September 18, 2009, which prohibits armed attack or threat of armed attack against nuclear facilities in operation or under construction, shall be fully complied with.

25. Call on all States to strictly fulfill their national responsibilities for nuclear security. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not come at the expense of the natural environment and human health. The Japanese government should properly address the disposal of nuclear contaminated water of Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in a responsible and constructive manner, make sure that the stakeholder countries can continuously participate in the independent sampling and monitoring under the framework of the IAEA, take their concerns seriously, cooperate in improving international monitoring measures, and keep the disposal under strict international supervision in the long term.